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How will Peter Magyar’s win affect Hungary’s policy on Ukraine?
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Key Judgements
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- Peter Magyar will assume Hungary’s premiership in May.
- Magyar’s win ends Viktor Orban’s sixteen years of governance.
- Magyar will likely steer Hungary in a moderately pro-Ukraine direction.
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Background
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Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Fidesz Party has led Hungary since 2010. Fidesz steered Hungary in what Orban has called a “patriotic” and “sovereigntist” direction. This direction included a non-interventionist approach to Ukraine’s war with Russia. Orban has publicly rejected military and financial support for Ukraine in multiple social media statements. Orban’s policy has also been non-interventionist, and Budapest has blocked EU assistance to Ukraine on multiple occasions since 2022.
On April 12th, Peter Magyar, the leader of the center-right Tisza party, won a majority of the vote in Hungary’s parliamentary election. Overall, Tisza secured 138 of 199 seats in the Hungarian Parliament. Magyar will take office in May. His victory comes after Hungarian elections received international attention for their ideological and foreign policy implications.
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Assessments
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In the short term, Magyar’s win signals that Budapest will likely (55-80% chance) pursue limited interventionism in Ukraine without fully committing significant military or financial aid. This limited support reflects his balancing of pro-Ukraine and non-interventionist pressures. Hungary’s energy dependence on Russia in particular limits the speed and scale at which Budapest can increase support to Ukraine without losing a critical fuel provider.
However, Brussels’ leverage over Hungary acts as a counterweight which pushes Budapest towards more overtly pro-Ukraine positions. This is a moderate-confidence assessment based on public speeches, campaign rallies, and official press releases. The judgement presented in this assessment was reached through consulting multiple credible sources and depends on the base assumptions that power will transition peacefully to Magyar. Lack of visibility into Tisza’s internal politics moderated confidence levels.
Please see US Intelligence Community Directive for an explanation of confidence levels and terms of estimative probability.
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Figure 1: Hungary Energy Sources
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European Union:
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Degree of influence: moderate; based on alignment with Magyar’s policy platforms and Hungary’s EU membership.
Explanation: As a member state, Hungary is subject to the laws and regulations of the European Union. These regulations could push them towards a more pro-Ukrainian stance.
Supporting Evidence: Some EU policy positions align with Magyar’s platform. Most notably, Orban’s government froze billions in EU funding to Ukraine. Budapest promised to stop blocking these funds following Tisza’s victory. Magyar also advocated for reducing Russian energy imports, which would be in line with the European Union’s own petroleum policy platform. EU leaders and Volodymyr Zelensky congratulated Magyar following the election and called his win “constructive.” Additionally, the European Union has previously issued injunctions against Hungary under Orban.
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Russia:
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Degree of influence: High; based on energy dependence and direct support for Orban.
Explanation: Russia’s position as Budapest’s main energy supplier and their relations with Viktor Orban provide leverage over Magyar’s government which could limit engagement with Ukraine.
Supporting Evidence: According to the US International Trade Administration, Russia provides 80% of Hungary’s natural gas, 85% of Hungary’s petroleum, and 100% of Hungary’s nuclear fuel. Orban emphasized Russia’s role as Hungary’s primary energy exporter on multiple occasions throughout the electoral season. In light of this economic interdependence, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto has confirmed consultations with his Russian counterpart concerning EU petroleum sanctions. Further, Magyar accused Fidesz of working the Russian military intelligence services “with the aim of influencing the outcome of the Hungarian elections.” For example, the Washington Post cited unspecified European intelligence services as claiming that Russian-backed actors sought to stage an assassination against Orban. A definitive investigation has not yet been conducted to determine the claim’s legitimacy, and the source’s reliance on second-hand claims weakens its credibility.
